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Abstract
Crawford and Haller (1990) describe a repeated two-player coordination game defined by the absence
of a common language. Coordination is achieved only through path dependent play relying on time
consistent labels. We consider a game played by a large population similarly looking to coordinate but
without the consistency in labels over time and with asymmetric coordinated payoff so that players have
differing preferences regarding which coordinated structure emerges. In experiments, we link subjects
together in a social network with limited ability to observe others. The complexity of the game and multi-
tude of states thwarts solving for optimal play and yet the population demonstrates success in employing
path dependency and the consistency of the social relationships to learn to coordinate. To capture this
evolution, we model decisions with an experience-weighted attractor having recency, reinforcement, and
lock-on biases. We find considerable heterogeneity in biases across individuals. Drawing on the observed
biases, we conduct simulations to identify the extent to which individuals and environment determine
group dynamics.
Keywords: Experiment, Simulation, Social Network, Experience Weighted Attraction, Nested Logit
(JEL Codes: C73, D83, D85)
1 Introduction
This paper considers the emergence of social structures consistent with the desire to be an early adopter
of a subsequently popular trend. A reward for conformity induces a population to employ social links to
organize into a structured network as a means of generating coordination. In the coordinated structure, the
population’s leader identifies the choice for adoption. The choice disseminates to and through the followers
via a network of imitations. The premium reward to acting in advance of the trend means that the number of
followers and whether multiple leaders can be present in equilibrium depends on the relative strength of the
reward to conformity versus the premium to leading and on the number of options faced by the population.
The investigation take place with human subjects in a behavioral lab and by simulation using virtual
subjects. Whether human or virtual, players are rewarded for participating in the social phenomenon popular
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with their cohort and paid a premium for adopting the popular choice in advance of the phenomenon. Play
takes place over a number of periods with a new set of product alternatives introduced with each period.
The player has the option to adopt an alternative autonomously or through imitation of another player.
Imitation delays the player’s adoption but can be a mechanism for ensuring participation in an emerging
phenomenon. A unique leader and population of followers is the coordinated structure that produces the
cooperative outcome. All players benefit under the cooperative structure with the leader deriving greater
benefit than the followers.
The experiment tests for conditions under which a population of subjects are able to use experience
and recall to overcome the absence of a common language and possible competition for the leader position
to identify a strategy profile that produced the desired coordination. Subjects are modeled as employing
a Nested Logit model to choose between available actions. The probabilities associated with each action
evolve over time as the value of each action is updated according to an Experience Weighted Attractor
model of Camerer and Ho (1999). The experiments provide an opportunity to estimate the parameters of
the model based on observed choices by human subjects in the lab. Simulations provide insight into how
the different parameters on individual adaptive behavior affect group dynamics. Simulations using virtual
subject modeled on the fitted parameters of human subjects also offer an opportunity to explore the role of
individual behavior is shaping the outcome of the population dynamics.
1.1 Related literature
The players in Crawford and Haller (1990) overcome the absence of a common language by using experience
and recall to identify a strategy profile that produced the desired coordination. In the current investigation,
the options and labels are new to the players at each decision. Players cannot rely on their choice history to
facilitate coordination but can organize to make use of stable social connections to develop paths through
which decisions can decimate through the population.
The desire to adopt a popular choice means that a component of the reward is much like that which results
from the strategic complementarities found in Katz and Shapiro (1985). Coordination in adoption also plays
a role in the Brock and Durlauf (2001) model of conformity and the Arthur (1994) El Farol problem. Classic
evidence of social influence in individual decision even in the absence of mechanical complementarities can
be found in Whyle (1954), Katz and Lazarsfeld (1955) and Arndt (1967). More recent evidence involves
modern technology, such as mobile phone networks as in Hill et al. (2006), and online chat rooms as in Dwyer
(2007).
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Early examples of the influence of social network on decisions include Schelling (1971), Schelling (1973),
Katz and Shapiro (1985), and Banerjee (1992), all of which model the bi-directional interaction between
individual decisions and global behavior.1 The architecture of a social network defines how information
and influence disseminate across a population, as emphasized by Ellison (1993). Brock and Durlauf (2001)
is an example for which peer effects are global, allowing tractable analysis using mean-field interactions.
Cowan and Jonard (2004) document the impact of local and global connectivity on overall knowledge across
a population. The leader and follower structure of the present setting emerges endogenously to serve social
and individual interests.
Jackson and Wolinsky (1996) provides the setting employed in a number of models examining endogenous
network formation, including Bala and Goyal (2000), Watts (2001), Jackson and Watts (2002), and Dutta
and Jackson (2000), and with some modification, Kirman et al. (2007). In these models, the individual payoff
function is increasing in connectivity. Players maximize connectivity subject to costs of maintaining a link.
Alternatively, links can be a mean to an end not directly proportional to connectivity, as in the endogenous
network formation of Galeotti and Goyal (2010). The setting shares in the asymmetry of the payoff with the
core population paying more to obtain the information that is eventually shared by the entire population.
Acemoglu et al. (2010) also considers the utility gain of the information that flows over the network rather
than employing network connectivity as the source of utility.
The present paper determines whether a population of subjects are able to organized into the cooperative
outcome represents the equilibrium of a static game as developed in Goldbaum (2014). Multiple cooperative
structures exist and the asymmetry in the payoff means that the players have conflicting interests with regards
to which structure emerges. The two player version of the current environment reflects the endogenous
heterogeneity that can emerge in R&D and duopoly games, as in Reinganum (1985), Sadanand (1989),
Hamilton and Slutsky (1990), Amir and Wooders (1998), and Tesoriere (2008). Such games may be played
over two stages, but the parallel emerges in the decision regarding when the player wishes to act. Amir et al.
(2010) generalizes the issue of symmetry breaking, as is the case when a leader and follower emerge. The
general n player game retains the issues regarding asymmetry in outcome while introducing new strategy
possibilities. It also introduces the possibility of best response cascades as in Dixit (2003) and Heal and
Kunreuther (2010) as ways of refining the equilibrium set.
The relatively large population employed for the experiments means that subjects, if they play strate-
gically, are likely to be better modeled as n two player games involving the individual playing against the
1Watts (2001) and Jackson and Watts (2002) offer useful literature reviews of works on social influence.
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population rather than one n player game, as considered in Tapiero (2014).
2 Model
A population of n players face a m options in a new choice set. Call the m options alternatives. Each players
chooses an action that will lead to the possible adoption of one of the alternatives. Whether an individual
adopts a alternative, which one, and when is determined by the action profile of the population. Incentives
reward early adoption of a popular alternative. The players lack a common language with which to refer to
the alternatives. The game is played repeatedly with a new set of alternatives in each period. In this way,
the game differs from Crawford and Haller (1990) for which consistency of the alternatives and their labels
over time allows the players to overcome the lack of a common language through strategic path-dependent
play. There is, instead, consistency in the relationships between players. Coordination, should it emerge, is
achieved by exploiting the consistency of the relationships.
2.1 The game
Let N = {1, . . . , n} be a set of players and let the n × n matrix g describe the potential (directed) links
between players. If i can form a link to j then gi,j = 1 and gi,j = 0 otherwise. Let gi,i = 1 always. Write
Nd(i; g) = {j ∈ N\{i}|gi,j = 1} for a set of players to which i can form a link.
Let Ot = {O1, O2, . . . , Om} be a set of alternatives. To implement the absence of a common labeling of
the options, let K = {“A”, “B”,. . . } be a set of m labels for these options and let the private one-to-one
function fi, determined by nature, map from labels to options, fi,t : K → Ot. Each player thus privately
observes a set of labeled options Ki = {“A”, “B”, . . . }. Each player sees different labels and for every i, j
pair there is a time t one-to-one correspondence, hi,j,t : Ki,t → Kj,t, that is unknown to the players.
Let ai,t denote the action of player i in period t. Players act simultaneously with each player choosing
(i) one of the m options, or (ii) to link to another player. In the former case, if player i chooses option Ok,t,
then assign ai,t = f−1i,t (Ok,t) = ki,t, the label by which player i refers to option Ok,t. If player i links to
player j, then assign ai,t = j. A player who chooses an option is said to lead while a player who links to
another is said to follow. Thus, the set of actions for player i is Ai = Ki ∪N\{i}. Write at = (a1,t, . . . , an,t)
for an action profile, where ai,t ∈ Ai,t. Let A (g,m) be the set of all possible action profiles given g and m.
An action profile at induces an n × n matrix st describing the actual links between the players as
determined by their actions in period t. If ai,t = j then let si,j,t = 1 and if ai,t ∈ K, such that i leads, then
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si,i,t = 1. Otherwise, si,j,t = 0. Thus, for the matrix s, we have s · 1 = 1. Allow that j is a predecessor
of i in t if si,j,t = 1 or if there is a sequence of players j1, . . . , jr such that si,j1,t = . . . = sjr,j,t = 1. Write
NP (i; st) for the predecessors of i. Allow that j is a successor of i if sj,i,t = 1 or if there is a sequence of
players j1, . . . , jr such that sj,j1,t = . . . = sjr,i,t = 1. Write NS(i; st) for the successors of i in t. A leader is
an agent who leads and has a non-empty set of successors. It is possible to lead without being a leader.
Let NL(st) denote the set of players who lead. If player i leads and player j is a successor of i, this makes
player i player j’s leader. Note that each player i has at most one player who leads as a predecessor, that is
|NL(st) ∩ NP (i; st)| ∈ {0, 1} for each i. It is possible for a successor to be without a leader. Additionally,
let Li identify the predecessor of i who is a leader.
A notion of distance is needed in order to specify payoffs.2 Define the distance from a player i to her
adopted option as the number of players between i and the option. Using di to denote player i’s distance,
di =

0 i ∈ NL(st)
1 si,j.t = 1, j ∈ NL(st)
r + 1 si,j1,t = . . . = sjr,j,t = 1, j ∈ NL(s)
∞ otherwise.
Use D(s) to denote the matrix for which each row contains the ordered pair (di, Li). A second useful distance
measure is the distance from a successor to a predecessor. Use di,j,t to denote the distance from successor i
to predecessor j measured in the number of links connecting i to j. Observe that when Li = j, di,j,t = di,t.
Let NJ(i; at) denote the set of players who adopt the same option as does player i (inclusive of i). Let
NT (i; at) denote the subset of NJ(i; at) who are of greater distance from the option than is i. Formally,
NJ(i; at) = {j ∈ N |fi,t(ki,t) = fj,t(kj,t)} and NT (i; at) = {j ∈ NJ(i; at)|dj,t > di,t}. Let µJi,t = |NJ(i; at)|
and µTi,t = |NT (it; at)|.
The payoff for player i is
pii,t = pi(i; st) = aJ(µ
J
i,t − 1) + aTµTi,t (1)
with coefficients aT ≥ 0 and aJ ≥ 0. The first element of the payoff rewards conformity. The second element
rewards early adoption based on the number of subsequent adopters of the same alternative. distance
advantage a player has over other players. Let Π(at) = (pi1,t, . . . , pin,t)′.
The static version of the developed game has a Nash equilibrium identified by the s, reflecting that the
2The notion of time and distance are interchangeable when adoption disseminates at a rate of one unit of time per link.
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game is played in the strategic use of links rather than an attempt to strategically choose from the available
alternatives. For use in the following propositions, let
µ∗ =
1
1− (m− 1) aJaT
≤ 1. (2)
The structures identified in Goldbaum (2014) as the Nash equilibria to the static game will simply be referred
to as the cooperative structures of this dynamic game.
Proposition 1. For (m − 1)aJ ≥ aT and for every i ∈ N , s is cooperative structure if i is a leader with
a successor population NS(i; s) = N\i and where, for each j ∈ NS(i; s), dj,i is the distance attained by
minimizing the number of links between j and i.
Proof. see Goldbaum (2014) Propositions 3.
Proposition 2. For (m − 1)aJ < aT and for every i ∈ N , s is a cooperative structure if i is a leader with
a successor population of size such that (|NS(i; s)| − µ∗)2 < 1 and where, for each j ∈ NS(i; s), dj,i is the
distance attained by minimizing the number of links between j and i and dj,i ≤ dj′,i for all j′ /∈ NS(i; s).
Proof. see Goldbaum (2014) Propositions 5.
By Proposition 1, for a large number of options or a sufficiently large relative payoff to conformity,
the cooperative structure has everyone within the population organizing around a single leader in order to
maximize expected payoff in a single period given the actions of the other players. For every player, there
is an equilibrium structure in which she is the leader. This structure offers the highest conformity payoff
attainable. For the leader, it offers the highest possible payoff attainable to any individual from any feasible
structure and for the followers, the highest possible autonomous payoff given the leader.
Under the conditions of Proposition 2, those who would otherwise be most distant from the leader find
that leading offers a higher expected payoff than following. The relatively high payoff to early adoption
induces them to gamble that they will independently choose the same alternative as the leader and thereby
enjoy the same payout as the leader.
The determinants for the equilibrium size of the successor population are the ratio aJ/aT and m. It is
independent of the topology of g or the realization of s. For the dynamic game played by the experiment
subjects, the structures described in Propositions 1 and 2 need not be equilibria. For this reason, they will
be referred to as the “cooperative structures.”
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2.2 Individual information and strategy estimation
Participants are players in a complex dynamic game for which the equilibrium strategy is not obvious.
Strategies that increase the likelihood of emerging as the leader conflict with the strategies that help produce
the cooperative structures It is most likely that optimal strategic behavior for player i involves a degree of
path dependence that revolves around what can be inferred about st from the actions and payoffs observed
for the Nd(i; g) population. At the beginning of each period, the player’s information set includes the player’s
personally observable outcomes of all prior rounds. Let Xi,t = {xi,t−1, xi,t−2, . . . , x1} where xi,t contains
information observed by player i at the end of period t. This includes the total popularity of each alternative
as it evolved during the period. Players also observe alternative choice and timing of each contact’s adoption
within the period.
From the information in xi,t, players can calculate their payoff for period t. They also estimate the
counterfactual values of the actions not taken in that period. They cannot compute counterfactuals with
certainty because the players do not know the entire structure of st. What they can do, for example, is
take the actual adoptions as given and compute the payoff had they adoption according to each of the
counterfactual actions.
The estimated empirical model uses a nested logit to assign probability to each action using path depen-
dent performance measures, updated according to the experience weighted attractor (EWA). In period t, for
θi,t ∈ [0, 1] and
∑
j
wji,t = 1, let
θi,t = Pr(i leads in t)
(1− θi,t)wji,t = Pr(i follows j in t).
For agent i, if j is in her contact list, then wji,t ∈ [0, 1], otherwise wji,t = 0.
The performance associated with each strategy option is tracked and updated according to the experience





i,t + (δl + (1− δl)1(xt = l))pii,l,t
Nt+1,l
(3)
Nt+1,l = 1 + φl(1− κl)Nt,l
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i,t + (δf + (1− δf )1(xt = d))pii,j,t
Nt+1,f
(4)
Nt+1,f = 1 + φf (1− κf )Nt,f .
Relative performance determines the probability of adoption of an action according to the nested logit model.






















The EWA captures the players changing perception of attractiveness of each possible action. The pa-
rameters of the EWA reflect the extent to which participants update old information with new and how
much credence they give to the counterfactuals. Decreasing φ from one towards zero shifts weight towards
more recent performance realizations, producing “recency” in the weighting of past performance. Decreasing
δ from one towards zero down-weights the counterfactual payoffs so that at the extreme δ = 0 the agent
engages in reinforcement learning. For κ → 1, persistent performance differences accumulate over time to
drive probabilities towards the extremes, known as “lock-in”.
Correlation between the choices in a multinomial logit environment requires estimation with a nested
logit. The Generalized Extreme Value distribution upon which the nested logit is based allows for correlation
within the “nested” options and is useful for decomposing choice options that are separated by an implicit
sequential ordering of decisions in a tree structure or by some other grouping mechanism.
The parameter µ ≥ 0 identifies how sensitive the players are to differences in the performance measures
with µ = 0 indicating indifferent between the actions.
The estimate of 0 ≤ λ ≤ 1 identifies the extent to which the player compartmentalizes the decision
about whether to lead or follow from the decision about who to imitate when following. For λ = 1, the
agent treats each options as independent. With A0 = · · · = Ad, then θi = (1 − θi)wji = 1/(d + 1). If
one option exhibits higher performance than the others, it draws probability weight away from the others
options equally. For λ → 0, the agent clusters all of the following options. With A0 = · · · = Ad the two
options in the parent decision regarding whether to lead or follow are given equal weight so that θi = 1/2.
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Each option in the dependent decision about who to imitate gets equal weight within the follow option so
that wji = 1/d for each j ∈ Nd(i). If one contact outperforms the others, it primarily absorbs probability
weight from the other contact. It also absorbs probability weight from the lead option, but only to the
extent that the aggregate performance associated with following increases with the additional probability
weight on the better performing contact. Nesting preserves the Independence of Irrelevant Alternatives, the




i) does not change when an irrelevant
option is added as a possible action.
3 The in-lab experience
Experiments were conducted at the ASBLab Experimental Research Laboratory of the University of New
South Wales and at the Veconlab of the University of Virginia. Subjects were recruited using the ORSEE
recruitment system.3
An experiment consists of 36 anonymous subjects seated at computer monitors. Subjects are informed
that the will be playing a game for 60 periods randomly grouped with 17 other participants. In each period
the group will face a list of six alternatives of which they can adopt one option in the period. The labels
on the different alternatives are randomly assigned for each member of the group so that Alternative 1 may
be labeled Choice 2 or player A and Choice 3 for player B. The labels are reassigned in each period. The
subject will be able to observe the decisions of d other participants in their group where d is either 3 or 4,
depending on the treatment. The observation list is randomly generated and changes every 20 periods. The
participants on the observation list will be labeled “Person A”, “Person B”, etc.
The subject are also informed about how decisions will be made. Each period consists of 7 subperiods.
Before a period begins, each subject will make two decisions, they will select (i) one of the six choices and
(ii) identify one of the members of their observation list to follow. They also identify which decision, (i) or
(ii), they wish to implement for the period. Figure 1 shows an example of the decision screen faced by each
subject at the start of each period.
Once everyone in a group has submitted their strategy for the period, the subperiods will begin ticking
down. If a subject chooses directly, the choice will be implemented in subperiod 1. If the subject chooses to
imitate a contact, they will implement the choice in the subperiod after the contact’s choice is implemented.
A representation of this is presented in Figure 2. This screen is not shown to the subjects.
3See Greiner (2004)
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A new set of op-
tions at the start
of each period



















pi = 0.03(12) + 0.09(10) = $1.26
pi = 0.03(12) = $0.36
pi = 0.03(2) = $0.06
pi = $0
Figure 2: Behind the scenes
The subjects are also informed of the earnings formula. They told the values of aJ and aT and that they
will receive earnings in each period,
earnings = aJ ×Number of People in your Group Who Selected the Same Alternative as You
+ aT ×Number of People in your Group Who Selected Your Alternative after you Did.
At the end of each period, after the last subperiod, the subjects are shown information about the popularity
of each option, the alternative implemented by each of their contacts, their own earnings for the period and
a calculation of the earnings they would have received for each of the alternative actions available to them.
Figure 3 is an example of the earnings screen seen at the end of each round. Across the top of the figure are
the six choices, labeled using capital letters. Individual agents, labeled using numbers, appear in rows below
the choices based on the distance from the adopted option.
After completing the game, the subjects provided basic demographic information and answer questions









larity of each option
Actual payoff for
action employed
Estimate of the counterfac-
tual strategy payoffs
Figure 3: Screen shot of results page
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Table 1: Treatments. Each session involves 36 subjects randomly allocated into two groups of 18 players
each. Subject play the game for a total of 60 round made up of three shuﬄes of 20 periods each. A subject
plays with the same randomly allocated group (and contact list) during the 20 period of a shuﬄe.
Session ID Population Rounds Location # Contacts aJ aT Ratio
1 2× 18 3× 20 AU 3 0.03 0.09 3:1
9 2× 18 3× 20 AU 4 0.05 0.15 3:1
10 2× 18 3× 20 AU 4 0.05 0.15 3:1
17 2× 18 3× 20 AU 3 0.03 0.09 3:1
18 2× 18 3× 20 USA 4 0.05 0.30 6:1
19 2× 18 3× 20 USA 4 0.05 0.30 6:1
25 2× 18 3× 20 USA 3 0.05 0.30 6:1
32 2× 18 3× 20 AU 3 0.05 0.30 6:1
33 2× 18 3× 20 USA 4 0.05 0.15 3:1
34 2× 18 3× 20 USA 4 0.03 0.09 3:1
A total of ten sessions were held. As reported in Table 1 the two manipulation involve altering the rates of
compensation for popularity and early adoption and altering the number of members on a subject’s contact
list.
4 Experiment results
We report results regarding the influences, internal and external, on whether a group forms into a cooperative
structure. We start with an anecdotal narrative and simple frequency measures of success. These will provide
a foundation from which to understand the estimates of the model capturing dynamic adjustment in player
strategy and the role played by individual decisions and environmental factors in driving organizational
outcomes.
4.1 Evolution
Of the 360 participants across the 10 different sessions, 319 lead in the first period. By the end of the first
shuﬄe (period 20), only 177 of the participants lead. The path from an initially unstructured, unorganized
group of individuals predisposed to independent adoption of the available alternatives to a structured popu-
lation able to coordinate on a single alternative involves a number of steps that can be seen in the populations
evolution in the experiments. It starts with some of the players choosing to follow rather than lead. If one
player, say player i, can attract a persistent set of successors, NS(i; st), even if small, this provides others in
the population the opportunity to observe the high payoffs offered by becoming a member of NS(i; st+1). For
(m − 1)aJ > aT , the larger the successor population, the greater its visibility to the remaining unaffiliated
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d \ ratio 6:1 3:1
3 0.167 (12) 0.25 (12) 0.208 (24)
4 0.25 (12) 0.708 (24) 0.556 (36)
0.208 (24) 0.556 (36) 0.417 (60)
Table 2: Probability of groups forming the cooperative structure. For the 3:1 payoff ratio, the coordinating
structure is present if the dominate leader has 13 or more followers. For the 6:1 payoff ratio, the coordinating
structure is present for 5 or more followers. Number of groups reported in parenthesis.
population and the greater the benefit to joining.
In those groups where the coordinated structure fails to form, the process typically breaks down when
early followers fail to remain as successors while NS(i; st) is small.
4.2 Simple frequencies
For (m− 1)aJ ≥ aT (Proposition 1), the group is identified as having successfully coordinated if, in the final
period, there is a single dominate leader with thirteen or more followers.4 Sessions with a payoff ratio of 6:1
for leading have (m− 1)aJ < aT and µ∗ = 6. Success is achieved if the structure in the final period consists
a dominant leader with five or more followers.
As reported in Table 2, while the coordinated structure emerges in all scenarios, the frequency of emer-
gence depends on the treatments. The coordinated structure emerges with greater frequency when the
premium earned by the leader is less extreme. Increasing d increases the number of other players each
participant is able to directly observe and reduces the overall distance information needs to travel to reach
everyone in the population.
Somewhat odd is the fact that it is the second shuﬄe out of three that enjoys the greatest success in
generating the coordinated structure.
4.3 Individual play, pooled model estimate
Individual play is estimated to evolve according to the EWA and nested logit model described in equations
3 through 6. Within a session, the periods t = 1, 21, 41 are each the first period of a new shuﬄe. With Ad1,
Ad21, Ad41 set to zero, the values of A01, A021, A041 reflect the player’s predisposition towards leading, which
may change based on the subjects prior experience. In the baseline model, the values of A01, A021, and A041
are free parameters chosen in the estimation procedure. The alternative model allows each participant and
individual bias as determined by their individual characteristics and personal experiences during the game.
4The standard is subjective based on analysis of group behavior. Increasing the threshold to fourteen and the frequency of
success is
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Table 3: Pooled: EWA and nested logit parameter estimates. Without characteristics, A0 is estimated as a
free parameter of the model reported as Aˆ0. With characteristics, A0 is estimated as a linear function of the
individual characteristics and experiences. Aˆ0 is the population average of the fitted value.
Without A0 Characteristics With A0 Characteristics
Global 3:1 6:1 Global 3:1 6:1
φl 0.728 0.732 0.731 0.806 0.801 0.830
δl 0.070 0.086 0.016 0.067 0.103 0.000
κl 0.541 0.501 0.712 0.801 0.777 0.800
φf 0.467 0.468 0.438 0.448 0.432 0.442
δf 0.491 0.534 0.433 0.495 0.536 0.443
κf 0.000 0.000 0.000 1.000 1.000 1.000
λ 0.431 0.440 0.373 0.465 0.478 0.433
µ 3.007 3.359 2.174 1.766 2.033 1.399
Aˆ01 0.794 0.768 0.857 1.252 1.181 1.341
Aˆ021 0.573 0.444 0.911 1.113 0.827 1.737
Aˆ041 0.419 0.238 0.932 0.850 0.410 1.871
N 360 216 144 360 216 144
Table 3 reports the estimated coefficients of the EWA and nested logit model (EWANL) for both the
baseline model with A01, A021, and A041 estimated as free parameters and the alternate model based on indi-
vidual characteristics. The reported Aˆ0i,t0 are the average fitted values for A
0
i,t0
of the indicated population.
The variables and associated coefficients for the determents of individual A0i,t0 are reported in Table 4.
Figure 4 displays the scatterplot of the parameter estimates produced by fitting the EWANL model to
individuals. Figures 4a and 4b display the lead and follow parameters respectively for the baseline model
with free Aˆ0i,t0 parameters. Figures 4c and 4d display the EWA parameters when the individual model is
estimated based on personal experiences in generating Aˆ0i,t0 . The variety of parameter values points to the
diversity in how individuals manage the measures of performance. The green points indicate the coefficients
of leaders. The distribution over the possible parameter space suggests that leadership was not the product
of a player’s strategy alone. The uniformity in the distribution of individuals across treatments points to
the environment, rather than individuals involved, as the explanation for the different frequency of success
in coordination.
Estimating the model with personal characteristics increases the concentration in the parameters, sug-





















































































(c) Individual leader EWA coefficient of in alternate model with



























(d) Individual follower EWA coefficient of in alternate model
with Aˆ0i,t0 estimated using personal characteristics
Figure 4: Individual behavior: A scatterplot of the parameters of the EWA from estimating the EWANL
model on individuals.
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Table 4: Pooled: Propensity to lead.
A0 Characteristics Global 3:1 6:1 AU US Avg. Std Dev
D
em
o age -0.032 -0.029 -0.033 -0.033 -0.030 21.691 2.990




extraversion -0.019 -0.001 -0.066 0.092 -0.103 3.191 0.724
agreeableness -0.068 0.028 -0.236 -0.044 -0.007 3.631 0.621
conscientiousness 0.046 0.039 0.044 0.004 0.093 3.439 0.636
neuroticism -0.036 0.049 -0.225 -0.019 -0.035 2.704 0.752
openness -0.060 -0.103 0.022 -0.150 0.004 3.399 0.561
cognitive reflection 0.056 0.083 -0.053 0.053 0.091 1.631 1.117




total lead decisions (out of 90) -0.003 -0.016 0.003 -0.002 -0.003 42.1 4.74
individual times lead (out of 5) 0.490 0.411 0.601 0.546 0.431 2.34 1.12
avg. distance from leader -0.173 -0.267 0.165 -0.103 -0.152 1.83 1.15
avg. profit -0.214 -0.479 1.290 -0.501 0.275 0.72 0.70
distance x profit 0.230 0.249 -0.629 0.433 -0.094 1.35 1.32
N 360 216 144 180 180
*Last 5 periods of prior shuﬄe
4.4 Analysis
4.4.1 Dynamic behavior
Consider the behavior of player 1 in session 17 who, over his three different shuﬄes, experienced both success
and failure of group coordination. Session 17 has a payoff ratio of 3:1 and d = 3 and thus is has settings
producing a 25% chance of a group organizing into the coordinated structure. Player 1’s first grouping, from
period t = 1, . . . , 20, fails to develop the coordination structure. Player 21 finishes the shuﬄe with four
successors, but player player 18 is one of a number able to attract a consistent following that lasted for a
number of periods.5 Player 18 peaks with four successors in t = 9. Player 1’s second grouping, t = 21, . . . , 40,
produces the coordinated structure with player 25 ending the shuﬄe with fourteen followers. Player 1’s third
grouping, t = 41, . . . , 60, is unique among all sessions in the frequency and number of players involved in
self-referencing loops. Player 18 is an early leader with thirteen successors in period t = 44 but only player 31
is directly linked to player 18. The remaining twelve successors are linked to 18 through player 31. In period
t = 45 player 31 leads and in period t = 48, players 18 and 31 imitate each other, forming a self-referencing
loop that includes fourteen players. A number of the periods that follow also include large self-referencing
loops, disrupting the emergence of consistent, reliable personal links. The shuﬄe ends with player 25 having
twelve successors (with only player 33 directly linked to 25).
Figure 5 depicts the time-series of fitted probabilities, θi,t and (1 − θi,t)wi,j,t, for payer 1 of session 17.
5Within each session, the 36 players have identification numbers 1, . . . , 36 that they retain while placed into groups of 18
players.
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(a) Full information EWA and unbiased (b) Full information EWA with individual bias
(c) Global estimated EWA with individual bias (d) Individually estimated EWA with individual bias
Figure 5: Player 1 in Session 17: Fitted values for Pr(lead)= θi,t and Pr(follow d)= (1 − θi,t)wi,j,t. Initial
biases toward leading are Aˆ01,1 = 1.65, Aˆ01,21 = 2.11, and Aˆ01,41 = 0.27. The global parameters used in frame
(5c) are as reported in Table 3 with characteristics. Player 1’s individual EWA parameters used in frame
(5d) are φl = 0.729, δl = 1, κl = 1, φf = 0.713, δf = 0.730, κf = 0.516, µ = 6.167 λ = 0.370, A01,1 = 16.33,
A01,21 = 9.78, and A01,41 = −0.863.
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The dots identifies the series of the actions chosen by the participant. The probability values reflect player
17’s initial biases and subsequent adaptation to the events he is able to observe around him. Each frame
of Figure 5 is the same underlying events and decisions, but generated based on a different set of EWA
parameters. Thus, each frame tells a different narrative of player 1’s behavior.
For 5a, all of the EWA parameters are set to one, A0i,1 = A0i,21 = A0i,41 = 0, µ = 1.766, and λ = 0.467.
The latter two are the estimated values for the global model with characteristics. These are the values that
a player would employ in order to make full use of all the data generated without decay and without an
initial bias towards leading. With these initial conditions, the value of θ1 is approximately 0.4 while each of
the three contacts have a probability of 0.2 each of being selected. For a full information player in player 1’s
position, the probability of leading soon falls to around 0.2 as the counterfactual option to follow contact
#3 (player 18) pays relatively well. Player 18’s success is short-lived but no good alternative emerge as no
single player attracts a consistent following. Persistent leading by player 1 and others in the group means
that meaningful opportunities to coordinate pass without being exploited.
Although shuﬄe two starts much like the first, here players do respond to the apparent opportunities
presented by the success of player 25 in attracting followers. This solidifies the emergent structure and
reenforcing the advantage to joining the hierarchy under player 25. Player 1 does not have a direct link to
player 25 but player 9 (contact #3) does. In this occasion, player 1 responds to the apparently successful
strategy of following. Player 1 first follows player 2 (contact #1) in period 31, switches back to leading, and
finally permanently switches to follow player 9 in period 34, largely responding to apparent opportunities
suggested by the full information evaluation of the options.
The third shuﬄe starts differently than the previous two. Player 1, like many other participants, start
the shuﬄe following and a dominant leader quickly emerges. Acting contrary to the signaled opportunities,
player 1 switches to lead in t = 44 but is fortunate to choose the same alternative as does the leader. Player
continues to be lucky in choosing the option chosen by the dominant leader when there is one, keeping the
performance measure for leading high. Leading also helps player 1 to avoid the self-referencing loops when
they occur. The increase in probability associated with contact #1 towards the end of the shuﬄe reflects
the emergence of player 25 as a leader with a large number of successors in the aftermath of the series of
self-referencing loops. Player 1’s shortest distance to player 25 is three links, via players 9 (contact #1) and
33.
The parameters used to generate the series in frame 5b, are the same as in frame 5a except that Aˆ0i,t0 =
(1.65, 2.11, 0.27) for t0 = 1, 21, 41, from the estimates of the global model based on player 1’s personal
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characteristics and experiences.
While contact #3 offered the best performance when measured without bias, the performance remains
week and is insufficient to overcome player 1’s bias towards leading. Including this bias helps to explain the
persistent decision to lead throughout the first shuﬄe and for most of the second shuﬄe. In the second shuﬄe,
player 1’s bias towards leading is even stronger but this time the payoff gain from following is sufficiently
large to overcome the bias. Including the bias, the θ1 is still high, but declining, when player 1 switches to
follow. The smaller bias towards leading is barely discernible in the probabilities at the start of the third
shuﬄe.
The series displayed in 5c are generated from the EWA, λ, and µ, from the global model with individual
characteristics included to estimate Aˆ0i,t0 . Two distinguishing features are produced by δl = 0.067 and
φl = 0.806. Approaching the extreme of reinforcement learning, the strong relative performance of contact
#3 in the first shuﬄe does not even register due to the heavy discounting of the counterfactual to leading.
The benefits of following only become apparent after the first sample of the strategy, as apparent by the
jump in the probability of imitating contact #3 to (1− θ1)w1,9 in t = 35.
Having φl < 1 means that the strong early bias towards leading dissipates as the approach fails to offer
commensurately high payoffs, producing the observed decline in θ1 from its high starting value in the first
and second shuﬄes.
The series displayed in 5d are generated from the EWA, λ, and µ, from the estimate of the player
1 specific model with free Aˆ0i,t0 . When compared to the global parameter estimates, the relatively large
value of µ = 6.167 means that the probabilities will tend to extremes for even small differentials in the
performance measure. This persistence in leading is reflected in the substantial value of A01,1 = 16.33 but
is still constrained to allow player 1 to follow in t = 16. The median value for A01,1 for session 17 is 1.57.
For the second shuﬄe, the bias remains large so to keep θ1 near 1 through the first 10 periods of the shuﬄe
before it falls quickly just before player 1 switches to follow contact #3. For the third shuﬄe, the bias favors
following, which is what player 1 starts out doing. Player 1’s switch to, and then persistence in, leading is
the consequence of lucky alternative selection and the atypical collapse of the cooperative structure.
Figure 6 plots the fitted values of θi as estimated by the global model as realized in the third shuﬄe. The
trends reflect the experiences of the individuals as st evolves around them. The frames, drawn from four
different environments, capture the different behavior norms that arise across the session. The top row has
the payoff ratio of 3:1 and the left column with d = 4. The players in the third shuﬄe of session 9 quickly fall
in behind a single emergent leader. The spikes in the θi of individual followers indicate that the follower’s
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(a) Session 9 with d = 4 and ratio 3:1 (b) Session 17 with d = 3 and ratio 3:1
(c) Session 18 with d = 4 and ratio 6:1 (d) Session 25 with d = 3 and ratio 6:1
Figure 6: Examples of the evolution of θi from the shuﬄe 3 (and group 2) of the session the indicated session.
In frame (a) a leader emerges early and the population quickly follows. In frame (b) a leader emerges and
the population slowly learns to follow. In frame (c) a leader emerges according to the cooperative solution
for a high payoff ratio but the population does not learn the lead or follow role that is appropriate to the
individual within the 20 periods as a group. In frame (d) no leader emerges and no one learns to follow.
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counterfactual choice coincided with that of the leader but that measure of performance quickly dissipates.
In the third shuﬄe of session 17, the players are much slower to fall in behind the single leader despite the
leader’s early emergence. This is attributable to the decrease in individual visibility and the greater distance
information must travel with d = 3 rather than 4.
Recall that for a payoff ratio of 6:1 the cooperative structure has a single leader with six followers
and that the remainder of the population should individual lead. Behavior consistent with this structure
would thus produce twelve players with θi near one and six players with θi near zero. The group the third
shuﬄe of session 18 are successful in producing a single dominant leader who has, in the final period, seven
followers, but an examination of the Frame 6c reveals that the distribution of θi fails to conform. This is a
consequence of the estimated behavior rather than the experiences of the players which, using the baseline
parameters, would have produced appropriate values of θi at the extremes. In the third shuﬄe of session 25,
no leader emerges able to attract more than two or three followers for more than a couple of periods. This
is characteristic of those sessions where no dominant leader emerges. As seen in Frame 6d the individual
θi values do not evolve to support persistent following, consistent with player behavior. The outcome is
interesting in how the failure of a leader to emerge is self-reinforcing. For a leader to emerge requires a
dedicated following, even if small in number, in order to attract more followers, reinforcing the decision to
follow.
5 Simulations
Simulations allow for a comparative static-type investigation into the impact of the different environmental
parameters as well as the different subject behavior as captured by the parameters of the EWA and nested
logit. The majority of the simulations in this section are populated by ex ante homogeneous subjects. This
means that the subjects all employ the same probabilistic nested logit model to determine their action for
the period and EWA model with which to update performance measures.based on experiences. Ex post,
the subject will differ in the probabilities associated with each action as performance measures are updated
based on personal experiences. For the simulations, each iteration involves a single “session” of 20 rounds
played by a population of 18 players. Each treatment is simulated for 1000 iterations. The frequency with
which the coordinated structure emerges according to the same standard applied to the human experiments
is recorded. Each treatment starts with the same seed value for the random number generator.
Table 5 reports the baseline parameters of the simulation. A random process determines the contact list
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Table 5: Parameters of the Base Simulation
Population n = 18 Participation (m− 1)aJ > aT
# potential links d = 4 Intensity of choice µ = 8
Periods T = 18 Independence λ = 1
Number of options m = 6 Recency φl = φf = 0.9
Conformity reward aJ = 0.05 Lock-in κl = κf = 0
Timing reward aT = 0.15 Reinforcement δl = δf = 1
Bias on leading A0(0) = 0.6 Counterfactual pic0 by experience
for each agent satisfying the condition of a strongly connected graph.
Two types of figures are employed to display the findings starting with Figure 7 below. For each treatment,
the figure is a single representative realization. The first plots the time-series of θi,t for the 18 members of
the population. The second figure plots the tree representation of the social structure as it is realized in the
terminal period of the simulation.
With (m − 1)aJ ≥ aT , the default simulation has as its coordinated structure a single leader and the
entire population choosing to imitate the leader, directly or indirectly through a chain of imitation links. The
variation in the parameters across different treatment only affects the evolutionary process of the population
and not the cooperative target.
5.1 Parameter Effects
While multiple players may lead, to be a leader one must have followers. A dominant leader refers to a
single leader attracting an outsized share of the population of followers. The simulations presented in this
section point to the regular success of the EWA and nested logit to generate a dominant leader in a variety
of settings and with a wide range of parameter values.
With the EWA governing individual strategy adjustments over time, an individual’s emergence is path
dependent. In the early periods of the simulation, success by the individual is the result of random transitory
events. In the absence of any strategy adjustment, an outcome favorable to individual i in one period will
not likely be repeated in the next. For a leader to emerge, others in the population must respond to an
individual’s success by decreasing their own θi,t and increasing the weight w
j
i,t. The process of observation
and adjustment allows the initially lucky individual to become a successful leader no longer reliant on luck but
empowered by her followers. The success of the EWA in generating a dominant leader is in its backwards-
looking measure of performance and the induced adjustments in strategy that reward success with more
success.
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(a) Time-series of θi,t (b) Social structure in the final round. Agent #7 emerged as
unique leader.
Figure 7: Base (81.3%): µ = 8, λf = 1, φf = φl = 0.9, κf = κl = 0, δf = δl = 1. A single agent leads in this
realization.
5.1.1 Baseline emergent structure
Figure 7 captures the emergence of a dominant leader and hierarchy of followers from an initially unstructured
social setting. As can be seen in 7a, all players start with the same probability of leading. This probability
drops off in the early periods as the earnings to the strategy fail to support the initial performance bias
assigned to leading. In this example, agent #7 emerges from the population as the only leader with a non-
trivial population of followers. Her dominants emerges in round 7. Over time, agent #7’s success breeds
success becomes embedded in the strategies of the other members of the population. Her emerges as leader
benefits the entire population. Of the 1000 iterations, a dominant leader emerges in 813 of the realizations.
This frequency is included in the caption of Figure 7.
5.1.2 Intensity of Choice
Manipulating the IOC parameter produces a variety of outcomes. Decreasing the IOC parameter decreases
agent sensitivity to performance differences. At a sufficiently low value, individual adjustment to transitory
random events are insufficient to create enough of a social advantage upon which to build social structure.
The result is a population that remains no more organized than in the initial period.
Figure 8 is produced by a simulation with µ = 4. This is still sufficiently high to enable successful
emergence of a unique leader within the time-frame of 20 rounds but the process takes longer and is less
frequent. At lower values of µ the process fails completely even when allowed to continue indefinitely. The
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(a) Time-series of θi,t (b) Social structure in the final period
Figure 8: ↓ IOC (58.5%): µ = 4, λf = 1, φf = φl = 0.9, κf = κl = 0, δf = δl = 1. A single leader of a unique
nontrivial tree emerges. Some members continue to lead. The low IOC slows the process of identifying a
leader and collecting followers.
IOC parameter must be sufficiently large to induce a adequate behavioral response to what are initially small
earnings advantages that occur when the population is unorganized.
5.1.3 Lock-in
For κh = 0, the performance measures are the average of weighted past performances. For κh = 1, the
performance measures are a cumulative measure of past performance. The distinction is that for κh = 0, the
expected performance differential is the average of the past performance differences with the weighted sum of
the past performances divided by the sum of the weights. For κh = 1, the expected performance differential
is simply the sum of the past differences. As an input to the nested logit, the increasing differential drives
the probability of adoption to the extremes with the superior action attracting all of the probability weight
from inferior actions (if φ = 1). With φ = 0.9, the accumulative impact of κ = 1 is curtailed by the decay
in memory.
Changing κ alone produces changes in the evolutionary process (at least over the 20 period horizon).
Relative to the baseline treatment, there is a greater number of members quickly moving to the extremes
of always lead or follow in the early rounds so that there is a greater dispersion in the types of behavior.
Despite the apparent persistence of a subset of the population towards early leading, eventually a single
dominant leader emerges. There is a decrease in the frequency of emergence in the cooperative structure
down the 75.7%.
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(a) Time-series of θi,t (b) Social structure in the final period
Figure 9: ↑ lock-on (75.7%): µ = 8, λf = 1, φf = φl = 0.9, κf = κl = 1, δf = δl = 1
5.1.4 Recency
Decreasing φl and φf increases the importance of recent observations on the current respective performance
measures. Lowering φ increases responsiveness to recent events. This improves the frequency of success
in emergence of the coordinated structure to near certainty. It also decreases the time necessary for the
structure to emerge, as captured in figure 10. With long memory, once a player emerges as the dominant
leader with a population of followers, the structure is stable. The short memory also introduces the possibility
of a change in leadership (though not observed in this example).
5.1.5 Independence
Increased independence produced by decreasing λ separates the decision about whether to follow from the
decision about whom to follow. As a consequence, while a particular contact may come to dominate the
decision about whom to follow, the option to lead may still retain a majority of the probability weight
despite being mildly inferior to the dominant contact. This latter feature is reflected in the slower decay in
θi,t for the non-leaders in the population as seen in Figure 11. The increase in independence also reduces
the frequency of emergence of the coordinated structure to about 50%.
5.1.6 Counterfactuals
A decrease in δ reduces the weight that the subjects give to the potential earnings of those actions not
employed. The value of δ can be interpreted as capturing the extent to which players observe the untried
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(a) Time-series of θi,t (b) Social structure in the final period
Figure 10: ↑ recency lead (98.1%): µ = 8, λf = 1, φf = φl = 0.5, κf = κl = 0, δf = δl = 1
(a) Time-series of θi,t (b) Social structure in the final period
Figure 11: ↓ Independence (49.6%):µ = 8, λf = 0.25, φf = φl = 0.9, κf = κl = 0, δf = δl = 1
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(a) Time-series of θi,t (b) Social structure in the final period
Figure 12: ↓ Counterfactuals (0%): µ = 8, λf = 1, φf = φl = 0.9, κf = κl = 0, δf = 0.4, δl = 1
actions. Reducing δl means that when a subject follows, they give little weight to the payoff that could have
been obtained when leading. The value of A0,t is updated with only a fraction of the potential earning form
leading. For δf < 1, the player down weights the potential earnings that could have been obtained from the
contacts not followed. The down-weighting by player i of contact j occurs whenever player j is not followed
regardless of whether player i leads or follows a different contact.
For δl < 0 (not shown), the down weighting of the lead counterfactual helps to facilitate the emergence of
the coordinated structure. Once a player attempts following, they are effectively less observant of the option
to lead and more likely to search out the best following option available.
For δf < 0, the players who lead are less observant of the potentially superior earning available when
following and when following are less observant of the potentially superior earnings available by following
one of the other available contacts. Both of these effects seriously undermine the process that generates
convergence on the cooperative structure. Players fail to take advantage of the option to follow and fail
to take advantage of the contact offering the highest historic earnings when they do. The consequence can
be seen in Figure 12. Of the 1000 iterations of this treatment none succeeded to generate the cooperative
structure with δf = 0.4.
5.2 Social Advantage
When initial conditions are randomly allocated to the agents, individual characteristics can influence emer-
gence. The ability to be seen by others in the population and potentially imitated is clearly an advantage. A
28
Figure 13: Distribution of ei among the general agent population (solid blue) and among dominant leaders
(long-dashed red). The conditional probability of leading (short-dashed black) increases in ei.
randomly generated network of contacts produces a non-degenerative distribution of incoming links for each
agent. Let ei be the number of potential links directed at agent i. As revealed in Figure 13, those with a
greater number of incoming links have a heightened probability for emerging as a leader. The distributions
and probabilities depicted in Figure 13 are generated from 10,000 simulation iterations. The solid (blue)
curve is the distribution over the entire population of 180,000 agents as initiated at the start of the simula-
tion. The long-dashed (red) curve is the distribution of the population of dominant leaders as realized at the
end of each iteration. The short-dashed (black) curve is the conditional probability of emerging as a leader
based on the agent’s ei, peaking at 36% for a player with 11 incoming links, in contrast to the unconditional
probability of 1/18.
The simulations used to generate the distributions in Figure 13 employ the baseline parameters. The
rightward shift in the number of incoming directed links for leaders relative to the general population captures
the benefit to greater social advantage. A player gains greater observability by being the target of greater
number of directed links. This improves the likelihood that favorable transient events will noticed and
accommodated by other players.
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# Contacts Premium to Lead Combinations
Model Demo(i) pˆicfl All 3 4 high low 3&high 3&low 4&high 4&low
Experiment 0.417 0.208 0.556 0.208 0.556 0.167 0.250 0.250 0.708
Global 1 own 0.011 0.011 0.011 0.027 0.0006 0.022 0 0.0325 0.0008
Global 0 own 0.014 0.012 0.015 0.034 0.0003 0.024 0 0.044 0.0004
Global grow 0 own 0.058 0.039 0.071 0.125 0.014 0.077 0.0008 0.172 0.021
Individual 1 own 0.041 0.024 0.052 0.055 0.031 0.045 0.002 0.066 0.045
Individual 0 own 0.074 0.044 0.094 0.077 0.072 0.085 0.003 0.069 0.106
Individual 0 rational 0.088 0.043 0.118 0.066 0.103 0.080 0.007 0.052 0.150
Table 6: Frequency of coordination in virtual experiments. Demo(i) indicate whether the model is estimated
using demographic and experience variables. If not, then the estimate of A00 is a free parameter. The column
pˆicfl identified the model for computing the counterfactual value of leading.
5.3 With condition (m− 1)aJ < aT
A decrease in (m − 1) aJaT changes the incentives to the most distant followers of the dominant leader. De-
creasing m improves the likelihood that leading will produce a match with the dominant leader, increasing
the expected payoff to the strategy. A decrease in aJaT increases the relative premium reward to leading.
Both changes increase the incentive to lead, and for (m − 1)aJ < aT the incentive is enough to induce the
most distant followers of the dominant leader into leading. From (2), the equilibrium size of the follower
population is µ∗ = 6 as computed based on aJ/aT = 6 and m = 6.
6 Virtual Experiments
The experiments suggest that there is a role for both environment and individual decision making in the
emergence of the cooperative structure. Simulations of the experiment are used to explore the role of
each. The simulations recreate virtually the treatments examined in each of the ten experiment session.
The simulations thus have 36 subjects allocated into two groups of 18 participants who play together for
20 periods before being reallocated into a new group of 18. The three different grouping means that the
subject plays for 60 periods total. The directed links connecting the subjects are the same as in the actual
experiment across all three allocations, as are the rewards for conformity and for timing advantage. The
virtual experiments are populated with virtual subjects who adapt their behavior according the the estimated
EWA and nested logit parameters.
Table 6 reports the frequency with which the cooperative structure emerges from simulations. The first
row reports the frequencies of the actual experiments (as reported in Table 2). Each subsequent row reports
the frequency of success from the virtual experiments. The setting of the virtual experiments recreates
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(a) Virtual Player 32 in Exp 9 (b) Virtual Exp 9, Shfl 1, Grp 1
(c) Virtual Exp 9, Shfl 2, Grp 1 (d) Virtual Exp 9, Shfl 3, Grp 1
Figure 14: Virtual Experiments: evolution of probability weights with EWA and nested logit parameters
from the Global model with individual characteristic information.
the settings of the actual experiments. There are ten different sessions replicating the treatments of the
experiments. Each session is iterated 200 times. The different virtual treatments consider different models
of individual adaptive behavior using the global and individual model estimates. A feature that improves
the ability of the virtual subject to coordinate depends on how they compute the counterfactual value of
leading. For pˆicfl identified as “own,” the subjects base performance of leading on the payoff to their own
considered choice. For pˆicfl identified as “rational,” the subjects compute the value of leading based on the
calculating the average payoff to those who lead.
The first frame of Figure 14 plots the probability weights associated with each action for a player during
the same experiment. The virtual subjects are modeled using the global parameters from the model with
individual characteristics. The remaining three frames displays the evolution of θi for the population in
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(a) Virtual Player 32 in Exp 9 (b) Virtual Exp 9, Shfl 1, Grp 1
(c) Virtual Exp 9, Shfl 2, Grp 1 (d) Virtual Exp 9, Shfl 3, Grp 1
Figure 15: Virtual Experiments: evolution of probability weights with EWA and nested logit parameters
from the Individual model with no individual characteristics.
group 1 of each of the three shuﬄes of iteration 1 of the virtual experiment 9. The evolution in θ32 and
(1 − θ32)wd,32 reflect the failure of the coordinated structure to emerge from the population. There are a
number of features of the global parameter estimates contributing the the failure to produce the coordinated
structure. The value of µ is too low to generate an adequate response to the superior performance observed
superior performance in the follow strategy. In addition, δf is also too low, preventing the subjects from
recognizing the superior performance offered by the follow strategy when they lead.
For Figure 15, virtual subjects are modeled using the individual parameters from the model without
individual demographic information. While still failing to match the rate of success observed in the experi-
ments, these simulations do display greater individual evolution in response to an evolving environment. A
dominant leader typically emerges who has a substantial following. Overall, an insufficient number of players
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adapts to the emergence of a leader within the given 20 periods of play. There are too many of the virtual
subjects who stubbornly continue to lead, undermining the emergence of a leader for the remainder of the
population to identify and imitate.
7 Conclusion
With an incentive to cooperate a large population of players is capable of developing the relationships
necessary to generate the coordinated outcome. That is, the subjects come to rely on social connections
to identify achieve coordination on each new alternative. Success is facilitated by appropriate rewards that
emphasize cooperation over competition and by increased social contacts that increase visibility and decrease
the distance that information must travel.
The combined Experience Weighted Attractor and Nested Logit model produces insight into how in-
dividuals update strategies based on personal experience and recall. There is considerable heterogeneity
among players. Those who successfully emerge as leaders reflect the heterogeneity of the larger population,
suggesting that environment and luck play a substantial role in determining who becomes a leader.
Simulations reveal some of the important features that are conducive to the emergence of the coordinated
structure. A homogeneous population distributed over a regular network of directed links will converge to the
coordinated structure for a broad range of parameters for the EWA and nested logit models. Convergence
on the coordinated structure arises from appropriately adaptive behavior by individual subjects responding
to the events they can observe. The key is that there has to be sufficient response by the subject to give
preference towards actions that reinforce lucky outcomes. Such adjustments will give social advantage based
on otherwise transient events. Continued adjustment rewards advantage, transforming initial luck into a
permanent advantage, eventually producing a leader and followers. For this to occur requires sufficiently
observant subjects, meaning that subjects have to pay attention to the counterfactuals offered by following in
order to recognize the benefits of following the right contact. Subject also have to be responsive to differences
in performance as they emerge. A population that is slow to respond will not adapt the network to take
advantage of transient events before they have passed.
The representative agent estimated from the pooled data does not have the characteristics necessary to
produce convergence to the cooperative structure. The value of µ is too low for the agents to respond to
the performance differentials that emerge when there is little social organization. Additionally, δf is also
too low so that the agents are not able to identify the right contact to follow and the advantage offered by
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following. The failure of the representative agent model also points to a failure to capture the heterogeneity
of the actual subject population.
Modeling individual behavior generates greater frequency in the emergence of the coordinated structure
than the representative agent. Greater adaptation by even a small portion of the population provides the
seeds of organization that others can respond to. There is clearly room for improving the model of subject
behavior within the experiments. The model fails to fully capture aspects of individual behavior that allows
human subjects to achieve the coordinated structure with greater frequency than the virtual subjects. This
will be the subject of continued effort.
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